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"But always good bulletins": Paul Scarceriaux und die Belgian Nautical Research Association
In: Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, Band 22, S. 59-78
Passagierdampfer als Hilfskreuzer: kurze Geschichte der Entwicklung einer Schiffsgattung
In: Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, Band 18, S. 151-162
To date there is no cohesive historical account of the international development of the auxiliary cruiser, and the scattered investigations of various single aspects of this ship category do not add up to a comprehensive survey. These were the circumstances discovered by the author as, upon request of the editor of this publication, he undertook to provide an introduction to the report by Captain Meyer of the only voyage of the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" as an auxiliary cruiser (see the following article). The first task was thus to gain an overall impression of this history. "Auxiliary cruisers", as defined here, were passenger steamships kept ready for battle by large shipping companies in countries with significant naval power. These ships were technically equipped for the installation of weapons, and their conversion could be carried out within a few days. The auxiliary cruiser was first to put into service by the Russians, who felt threatened by the British Royal Navy after the Russian-Turkish Balkan War. At that time a newly established shipping company, later called the "Russian Voluntary Fleet", bought three steamships from the Hamburg-America Line and had them converted for combat purposes. By the turn of the century, this originally Russian idea had been adopted by all of the world's Iarge navies . This brief study also touches on the various attempt worldwide to incorporate the legal status of the ship type "auxiliary cruiser" into international public and military law. Because of geopolitically based conflicts of interest between the naval powers, these endeavours were only partially successful. ln conclusion the author examines the auxiliary cruiser concept of the Imperial German Navy, whose goal it was to interfere with and impair the enemy's overseas commerce. The express Iiners originally designated for this purpose, however, were for various reasons inconceivably ill-suited to it. As early as 1915 the German Navy proceeded to commission cargo vessels as auxiliary cruisers, as they were inconspicuous and easier to supply. This was then the mode of operation employed by the navy during World War II.
Gedanken zu Frank Broezes "Albert Ballin, the Hamburg-America Line and Hamburg"
In: Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, Band 16, S. 87-92
In his article on Albert Ballin appearing in the "Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv" No. 15, 1992, pp. 135-158, Frank Broeze advocates two theses: (1) that contrary to popular opinion Albert Ballin used ruthless tactics to pursue his policy of expansion and (2) that he practiced a dubious financial policy and frequently did not know exactly what he wanted. Broeze bases his argumentation primarily on the observations of Johannes Merck and Max von Schinckel who both regarded Ballin from a critical distance. The author of the present article focuses chiefly on Broeze's accusations concerning the personal and business integrity of Albert Ballin and arrives at conclusions quite different from Broeze's: 1. In addition to the construction of the IMPERATOR class, Ball in also had internationally outstanding ships built for the South America routes (east and west coast) as well as for the East Asia service- a carefully targetted business policy, the success of which was hindered only by the First World War. Ballin's restraint in regard to austral traffic, which would have remained deficitary for Hapag because of the absolute predominance of the British, also points to a faculty for clever decision-making. 2. The low dividend payments of the Hapag in comparison to other shipping companies are not an indication of the negative effects of Ballin's business policies but of the reinvestment of a larger proportion of the profits. 3. The increase in the cost of the IMPERATOR's construction from the 25 million Marks first projected to a final total of 38 million Marks were not caused by Ballin's having habitually ordered ships in a "totally unbusiness-like" manner, but by the fact that the original plans were for a 30,000 ton vessel whereas the ship finally ordered weighed 51,000 tons. 4. There is no evidence to support Broeze's assertions that Ballin's behaviour was inconsiderate, violent, dictatorial, antagonistic and uncompromising . On the contrary, his main competitors in Bremen, England and among his pool partners have never expressed any such criticism. This is in itself a remarkable fact and speaks clearly for Ballin's integrity.
BREMEN" und "EUROPA": Kritisches zu einer "kritischen Studie
In: Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, Band 14, S. 133-138
Die deutschen Schnelldampfer. T. V, "Bremen" und "Europa" - Ausklang einer Ära
In: Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, Band 11
Die deutschen Schnelldampfer. T. IV, Die Imperatorklasse - Höhepunkt einer Epoche
In: Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, Band 8, S. 147-164
Die deutschen Schnelldampfer. III, Vierschornsteiner - der Griff nach dem Blauen Band
In: Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, Band 6, S. 91-108
Die deutschen Schnelldampfer. II, Die "Augusta-Victoria"-Klasse - Anschluß an das Weltniveau
In: Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv, Band 4, S. 93-108